Sample

We conducted one focus group with eight participants which lasted 112 min, and 21 individual interviews lasting between 40 and 77 min with an average duration of 56 min.

Of the 29 participants, five preferred not to share demographic data. The roles of the remaining 24 participants, their regions of activity and income-level of the countries of activity are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2 Demographic information of focus group and interview participantsForms of intimidation

Participants reported a wide range of forms of intimidation.

Public-facing attacks seeking to “give somebody a bad name” (A/AFR) and “create a negative opinion regarding one’s efforts” (A&R/EUR) were repeatedly mentioned. This included newspaper articles criticising organisations and funders, making false claims about funding sources, or misquoting an organisation’s work. In response to a research paper, a tobacco company published a letter which “not only criticised the research, but also criticised [the author] as a bad researcher” (R/EUR). An advocate shared that “almost any time we’ve released a major report, we’ll get a response, usually [claiming] unfactual things” (A/Global).

Members from a civil society organisation discovered posters portraying them “as agents of Big Tobacco and enemies of local communities” (A&R/SEAR).

Harassment on social media was seen as a growing concern, particularly around e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products, and the topic of tobacco harm reduction. In one instance, after talking on TV about e-cigarettes, a participant received “hundreds of threatening messages” online (anonymous). Attacks also involved legal threats and derogatory memes. Participants also reported attempts to impersonate them online and the creation of fake webpages.

Several participants faced legal threats from tobacco companies or third parties, usually in the form of letters sent to them, their employers or journal editors. An advocate explained “they sound like cease-and-desist letters but they’re not, they don’t really have that legal backing” (A/Global). No participant reported legal action against them.

Advocates and researchers also received non-legal threats, including anonymous calls and messages with threats of physical violence or death. In one case, it remained unclear how personal numbers had been obtained. In another instance, a tobacco company threatened to “go after [a researcher’s] job” if they continued their work (A/AMR). Elsewhere, organisations pushing for policy change, received calls from tobacco retailer associations threatening:

if [you] don’t stop, the association people and all the vendors will come and sit in front of [your] offices and homes, they will sit there in protest and shout slogans (R/SEAR).

Intimidating physical action, burglary and theft were also mentioned. In some places, the waste disposed of by organisations and individuals was searched. In other instances, the car of an investigator and the offices of organisations were broken into. In both times, computers were stolen, and no culprit was identified.

Participants also voiced suspicions of being followed physically or online. For example, industry staff attended tobacco control events, in person and online, and an unknown individual took photos during government-organised workshops. Industry staff, and individuals suspected to be industry-linked, also attempted to connect with participants, for example, via LinkedIn, Facebook, email or in person. A few participants had evidence that they were under surveillance: “colleagues […] found that in [company] reports, they say my name” (A&R/EUR). Participants also reported hacking, or the suspected hacking, of websites and email accounts.

A few researchers reported that their employer received large numbers of Freedom of Information requests. Through such requests – in some jurisdictions called Access to Information requests – citizens or residents can obtain documents held by public bodies, including public universities. Participants reported “vexatious requests” relating to their work. A participant concluded: “[such requests] are done in order to try and undermine our work or to slow us down” (R/EUR).

Responses to intimidation

Participants reported undertaking several activities in response to intimidation, which were grouped into four categories. A response could include activities across multiple categories. For instance, one could expose an attack (Offensive action) while also enhancing digital security (Defensive adaptation).

Non-action

Several participants noted that they or colleagues did not respond to intimidation, often referring to general ‘non-engagement’ practices. After being approached repeatedly via phone and in person, which made them feel uncomfortable, a participant recalled ignoring a company’s invitation to visit their factory (anonymous). In another instance, after a threatening call and suspected surveillance, a participant reported carrying on as planned and “nothing happened” (A/AMR). Non-action generally served to avoid “adding fuel to the fire” (R/EUR) or “create[ing] a bigger deal… than necessary” (A/Global).

Withdrawal

Projects can be abandoned due to safety concerns. Advocates were advised “not to try to do anything if you don’t think it’s safe” (A&R/WPR). In one instance, after researchers heard they were under surveillance, they decided to not go ahead “because we felt we couldn’t keep our people safe […], sometimes you have to walk away” (A&R/Global).

Some individuals and organisations would also move towards less risky areas such as awareness raising, or to other geographical regions. An advocate explained “for our next round of funding, we are avoiding a certain [geographical] area, [we] are fleeing” (A/WPR). Intimidation also drives individuals away from tobacco control:

they go to other areas where they are safe. [When] advocating for malaria or HIV, you wouldn’t have anybody threatening you, following you or trying to check your emails and stuff (A/WPR).

A participant mentioned a researcher who was repeatedly threatened and physically intimidated, “I haven't heard about any other work that [they have] done. And [they were] a very important researcher” (A/AMR).

Defensive adaptation

Another response was adaptation. This involved self-censorship which a participant described as “actually quite normal in tobacco control” (A&R/SEAR). Members of the tobacco control community would select their words very carefully. Reflecting on their work pushing for a bill, an advocate stated:

[w]hen you are labelled the way they label you, you begin to withdraw some of the things that you say in public. You don't want to be somebody that is hated […] because when you make comments, the next day somebody is in the radio saying, XYZ said, which you have not (A/AFR).

Another participant observed that some organisations “adopt a narrative which appears more legitimate for governments” (R/SEAR). More generally, changing a narrative could lead to “watering something down” (R/EUR) or weakening the message.

Intimidation also led to the adaptation of projects. For example, after researchers saw “very threatening posters”, they cut their visit to tobacco factories short: “like [a] guerrilla study [ …], before company agents received any news [about the visit], we talked [to] workers and got out” (A&R/SEAR).

Participants also reported taking other precautionary measures, including enhancing IT security, such as changing passwords regularly, using two-factor authentication, and using encrypted emails; only answering calls from known numbers; blocking social media users; getting a legal expenses insurance; working with multiple affiliations; and requesting legal review prior to publication. In these cases, participants perceived instances of intimidation as opportunities to improve practice.

Offensive action

Participants also reported pro-active responses to intimidation. These involved exposing threats and attacks in the media or on social media. Such actions were seen as improving safety: for example, making a death threat public would make a physical attack less likely. However, exposing intimidation in the media, “can give [aggressors] the platform to raise more voice” (A&R/WPR).

Some participants reported opting for a more targeted approach focusing on key stakeholders. For example, when newspaper articles attacked tobacco control organisations, advocates approached public officials, seeking to correct industry claims (A&R/WPR). When faced with false allegations, a researcher tried to “meet authorities to clarify the [tobacco company’s] intent. To say to [them], we are being misunderstood” (R/SEAR). Similarly, attacks were reported to employers and funders to make them understand that their purpose was to silence advocates and researchers.

Where those behind the attacks were known, complaints and legal action could be used. For example, following threats from a third party, advocates complained to the local police about the organisation (R/SEAR). Elsewhere, advocates took legal action: “[we] applied to the court to defend our rights, then our lawyer raised a complaint against those journalists, who created and distributed misleading information” (A&R/EUR).

Finally, evidence of attacks was also used for advocacy. A participant who had received derogatory and threatening messages, used these “to tell people how the industry is threatening people who are not talking in the same way they are talking” (anonymous).

Factors informing responses

Several factors influenced responses to intimidation. which were grouped into five interlinked and partially overlapping categories.

Firstly, whether evidence on the incident and those behind it was available. Some participants reported that to speak up or complain to the police, one would need evidence; without it, concerns could only be shared with colleagues.

Secondly, internal networks within organisations were crucial in shaping responses. The backing of colleagues was key. A participant shared that “having the support from [senior colleagues] felt really important, I felt like they wouldn't let me hang dry” (A/AMR), enabling them to continue their work. Another participant reported not being taken seriously by colleagues, which made them consider leaving the field (anonymous).

It was similar for employers: a few participants felt supported by them. In one case, the head of the organisation recognised the importance of their tobacco control work, leading to “inbuilt protection” (A&R/EMR), helping industry-critical activities to go forward. Other participants expressed concerns about employers having limited resources and “not wanting to be involved in complications” (A&R/WPR). In one instance, when discussing a project on industry interference, the employer appeared “far more worried about reputational and financial risks than the public health benefits of the information” (A&R/Global).

Thirdly, external networks, including funders, lawyers, media, and international organisations, also shaped responses. Some advocates said they were able to discuss attacks with their funder and received support and advice. In one instance, after an investigator was threatened and their computer was stolen, the funder “took the pressure off”, telling them they were not expected to publish the work (A/Global). At times, funders also helped with obtaining money for legal advice. Other participants reported lacking such support: “Our funds were earmarked, you couldn’t just say: We now have a legal problem. You better don’t mention it.“ (A&R/EUR). Another advocate worried that intimidation “c[ould] affect the flow of donor support” (A/AFR).

Connections with lawyers with an in-depth understanding of the tobacco industry was also important. They could, for example, assess whether a legal letter just sought to scare the recipient. But not all advocates and researchers had such contacts. Similarly, some found collaborating with journalists to expose intimidation very helpful, but others lacked such connections. International organisations were also contacted for support. An advocate recalled that obtaining a support letter was “very, very difficult [and took] a long time” (A/EMR) and another was asked: “why don’t you do something else in tobacco control?” (R/SEAR).

Fourthly, individual factors, including mindset, skills and previous experiences also informed responses. Many participants framed intimidation as an indicator of impact. In the words of one participant: “[attacks] give me the assurance that I'm on the right track” (anonymous). When faced with intimidation, participants also reported reminding themselves of their aims and values, one recalled “remember[ing] what [they] believe in” (A&R/Global). Responses were shaped by skills such as the ability to think ahead and conduct thorough risk assessments. A researcher found that “[i]t’s like chess, you have to always think five steps further” (R/EUR). Another researcher shared they tried to read everything from an industry perspective before publication, seeking to anticipate potential responses (R/EUR). Yet, other participants were less confident. A researcher stated “I don’t have skills to protect myself and my family. So, I keep [information about industry conduct] to myself.” (R/WPR).

Previous experiences also informed responses. The first incident was often perceived most challenging: “I specifically remember where I was when I [received the first legal threat]” (R/EUR). With every incident, they would learn and generally cope better.

Lastly, state-civil society relations also mattered. For some, the state could offer support, for example, with regulation “protect[ing] us against the misuse of personal information” (anonymous). The ministry of health was also seen as source of (potential) support (R/EMR), yet elsewhere, it was perceived “the weakest ministry with no budget” (A&R/WPR).

Some participants expressed concerns about repression against civil society more generally. An advocate explained that “[civil society’s] relationship with the government is not good […], there are just a few spaces in which we can interact [and] the space is shrinking” (A/AFR). It was also observed that governments were increasingly “buying a lot of narrative from the [tobacco] industry and coming down on civil society” (R/SEAR). Close government-industry links were a major concern. In such scenarios, “there’s just not that same rule of law and level of protection for individuals” (A/Global).

Ways forward

Participants identified several measures to address intimidation, with the responsibility lying with all tobacco control actors.

Report and monitor intimidation

It was perceived important to document intimidation: “We actually never thought of recording these cases of intimidation very seriously… But we should” (R/EUR). An advocate explained: “incidences [are] happening in each country […] but in the end, you look at them, they are repeating” (A/EMR). Through monitoring, patterns could be recognised and effective responses identified (A&R/Global).

Better preparation

In order to better prepare individuals and organisations, raising awareness was considered key. As a participant explained: “we hear a lot about industry interference, what kind of risks it puts on people is not talked about” (A&R/EUR). In this, it would be helpful for individuals to also realise that “not all of it leads to disastrous consequences, part of it is to intimidate you” (R/SEAR).

Specific training could also help. This should cover digital security: “lots of people expose their information just because they don't know [the risks]” (A/AMR); and libel, covering “what is defensible and what’s not, at a basic level” (R/EUR). Participants also expressed the need for training on documenting and handling intimidation. Any capacity building efforts could involve “practical examples and hands-on actionable advice” (A&R/EUR). While training could be part of project funding, participants also thought they should be accessible to all, for example, as online modules (A/Global).

Support those in need

More support or “a safety net” (A/EMR) was seen as needed for those in challenging situations. Access to legal advice and support from lawyers familiar with industry tactics would be crucial to check legal threats, draft response statements and “be a fallback in case [one] actually do[es] get sued” (R/EUR). A “network of high-level lawyers” (A/AMR) or “a central legal team” (R/SEAR) offering pro-bono support could be created and money for legal support could be set aside in each grant.

Furthermore, providing a safe space where individuals can voice their fears and concerns, and discuss next steps, would be important. Reflecting on their own experiences, a participant found that “just knowing you’re not alone is a big part” (A&R/WPR). Speaking to someone with lived experiences would be particularly valuable as they could empathise and offer reassurance. A participant explained:

you need colleagues who’ve been working on this industry, or similar industries, for a long time, who actually understand what is a real risk, what is a perceived risk, and also how to deal with it (A&R/Global).

In the case of public attacks, support could also involve others speaking up on one’s behalf, writing a collective response or publicising the incident internationally. An advocate mentioned that “having a global response like ‘We say that’s a bad thing’ could be really impactful” (A/Global), pressuring governments to act. Furthermore, someone experiencing an online firestorm, could be supported with positive messages (a ‘lovestorm’) (A&R/EUR). To be effective, all such interventions would need to be timely.

Look beyond tobacco control

Participants also felt that we could learn from other spaces in which intimidation happens. This could involve considering measures taken to enhance safety (e.g. secret meetings, buddy-systems) (A&R/EUR) and exploring existing tools for support, including The UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders—“Health is a human right, so we are of course human rights defenders!” (A/AMR). One could also seek to connect (more) with those working in other sectors with powerful corporations, learning from each other’s experiences and building alliances (A&R/Global).